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Abstract
We develop an empirical discrete choice interaction model with a
ﬁnite number of agents. We characterize its equilibrium properties –
in particular the correspondence between the interaction strength, the
number of agents, and the set of equilibria – and propose to estimate
the model by means of simulation methods.
In an empirical application, we analyze the individual behavior of
high school teenagers in almost 500 school classes from 70 schools. In
our baseline model endogenous social interaction eﬀects are strong for
behavior closely related to school (truancy), somewhat weaker for be-
havior partly related to school (smoking, cell phone ownership, and
moped ownership) and absent for behavior far away from school (ask-
ing parents’ permission for purchases). Intra-gender interactions are
generally much stronger than cross-gender interactions. In a model
with school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects social interaction eﬀects are insigniﬁ-
cant, with the exception of intra-gender interactions for truancy.
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11 Introduction
Early contributions by Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949), Leibenstein (1950),
Pollak (1976), and others show that economists have recognized the poten-
tial importance of social interactions for a long time. The slow progress of
empirical research in this area is to a large extent related to a number of
methodological problems. As described by Manski (1993, 2000) and others,
a major diﬃculty is to disentangle endogenous social interactions (which im-
ply a social multiplier eﬀect) from other types of social interactions (which
do not imply a multiplier eﬀect). Another problem is the endogeneity of
reference groups. Recent years have shown an increasing number of empir-
ical studies searching for credible empirical evidence on social interactions,
in part by using data that are quasi-experimental in nature; see Sacerdote
(2001), Durlauf and Moﬃtt (2003), and Duﬂo and Saez (2003) for examples.
The present paper focuses on methodological problems related to a spe-
ciﬁc but frequently encoutered situation: social interactions in small groups
when choice variables are discrete. In a discrete choice model with endoge-
nous social interactions, the choices of other individuals are explanatory
variables in the equation describing the choice behavior of a given indi-
vidual. For estimation and other purposes, the reduced form (or “social
equilibrium” or “solution”) of the model is required. While the reduced
form is straightforwardly obtained in a linear model with continuous vari-
ables, its derivation is more complicated in the case of discrete variables. As
already noted by authors analyzing the simultaneous probit model (see e.g.
Heckman, 1978 and Maddala, 1983), such models may not have a solution
or may have multiple solutions. This in turn may yield problems regarding
the statistical coherency of the model.
In Section 2 we present the model and characterize its equilibrium prop-
erties, in particular the correspondence between the interaction strength, the
number of agents, and the set of equilibria. Section 3 proposes to estimate
2the model by means of simulation methods, assuming that observed choices
represent an equilibrium of the static discrete game played by all interacting
agents. Section 4 is devoted to an empirical application. We analyze a sam-
ple of 485 high school classes with detailed information on the individual
behavior of the students within each class. As all students in a sampled
class are interviewed in principle, the data set has rich information on the
behavior of potentially important peers of each respondent. We estimate the
model for ﬁve types of discrete choices made by teenagers: Smoking, truancy,
moped ownership, cell phone ownership, and asking parents’ permission for
purchases. To control for sorting into schools and omitted variables that
induce a positive correlation between peers, we also estimate versions that
allow for within-class correlation of error terms and for school speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. We ﬁnd strong social interaction eﬀects for behavior closely related
to school (truancy), somewhat weaker social interaction eﬀects for behav-
ior partly related to school (smoking, moped and cell phone ownership)
and no social interaction eﬀects for behavior far away from school (asking
parents’ permission for purchases). Intra-gender interactions are generally
much stronger than cross-gender interactions. Once we control for school
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects social interaction eﬀects become insigniﬁcant, with the
exception of intra-gender interactions for truancy.
A number of recent papers have analyzed social interactions in a dis-
crete choice framework. Brock and Durlauf (2001a and 2003) use a random
ﬁelds approach to study aggregate behavioral outcomes in an economy in
which social interactions are imbedded in individual decisions. Equilibrium
properties of this model are derived by imposing a rational expectations
condition on the subjective choice probabilities of the agents and by assum-
ing that the number of agents is suﬃciently large that each agent ignores
the eﬀect of his own choice on the average choice level. In contrast, the
present paper describes behavior in relatively small groups of a given size
3in which choices of other individuals can be assumed to be fully observable.
For this reason, it is more appropriate to model the interactions as a non-
cooperative game, by making an individual’s payoﬀ dependent on the actual
choice of others in his group. In the analysis, we will focus on the one-shot
pure Nash equilibria of this game. In a recent paper Tamer (2003) proposes
a semiparametric estimator which allows – under certain conditions – for
consistent point estimation of the model in the N = 2 case without making
assumptions regarding nonunique outcomes. Its extension and empricial im-
plementation to N >> 2 have not been fully developed as yet. Gaviria and
Raphael (2001) analyze school-based peer eﬀects in the individual discrete
choice behavior of tenth-graders. However, their econometric model ignores
multiplicity of equilibria.
2 Discrete Choice Interactions and
Multiple Equilibria
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a population of N individuals indexed by i, i = 1,2,...,N. Each
player i faces a binary choice and these choices are denoted by an indicator
variable yi which has support Yi = {−1,1}. 1
Yi is the strategy set of player i and Y = ×N
i=1Yi. Elements of Y are
called strategy proﬁles or choice patterns. A strategy proﬁle is denoted by
y = (yi,y−i), where y−i = (y1,y2,...,yi−1,yi+1,...,yN)0. Note that the
number of elements in Y is 2N. Each individual makes a choice in order to
maximize a payoﬀ function V : Y → R ∪ {−∞}. For ease of exposition we
will sometimes refer to y = 1 as “smoking” and to y = −1 as “non-smoking”,
although we will also consider other types of behavior in the empirical part
1As long as the model has an intercept, the speciﬁc support used is immaterial: Working
with Yi = {−1,1} gives qualitatively the same answers as working with ˜ Yi = {0,1}.
When no intercept is added, the diﬀerence is that when using ˜ Yi = {0,1}, one implicitly
assumes that only positive choices have a social eﬀect. We thank Brian Krauth for helpful
discussions on this matter.
4of the paper.
In the standard economic approach, the payoﬀ function is dependent
on individual characteristics. Following the notation in Brock and Durlauf
(2001b), we assume that these characteristics can be divided into an ob-
servable vector xi and a random shock i(yi) that is unobservable to the
modeller but observable to agent i. Moreover, in interactions-based models
explicit attention is given to the inﬂuence of the behavior of others on each




Similar to Brock and Durlauf (2001b), we assume that the payoﬀ function
V can be additively decomposed into three terms:
(2) V (yi,xi,y−i,i(yi)) = u(yi, xi) + S(yi,xi,y−i) + i(yi),
where the ﬁrst term u(yi, xi) denotes deterministic private utility, S(yi,xi,y−i)
denotes deterministic social utility and i denotes random private utility. In
this paper we assume the social utility term to have the following form







Deﬁne y−ij = y\{yi,yj} so that (yi,xi,y−i) = (yi,xi,yj,y−ij). Note that
(3)
{V (1,xi,1,y−ij,i(yi)) − V (−1,xi,1,y−ij,i(yi))}−
{V (1,xi,−1,y−ij,i(yi)) − V (−1,xi,−1,y−ij,i(yi))} =
{S(1,xi,1,y−ij) − S(−1,xi,1,y−ij)}−
{S(1,xi,−1,y−ij) − S(−1,xi,−1,y−ij)} =
2γ
N−1.
Thus, for γ > 0 the utility of smoking (versus non-smoking) when another
person smokes as well is larger than the utility of smoking (versus non-
smoking) when another person does not smoke. In this case the parameter
γ measures the strategic complementarity between the choice of any pair
of individuals; for γ < 0 it measures the extent to which the choices are
5strategic substitutes.2 In fact, for γ > 0 (γ < 0), the model falls into the
class of supermodular (submodular) games. Supermodular (submodular)
games are games in which each player’s strategy set is partially ordered
and the marginal returns to increasing one’s strategy (in this paper moving
from y = −1 to y = 1) rise (decrease) with increases in the competitors’
strategies.3
Conditional on the choice by individual i, deterministic private util-
ity is assumed to be a linear function of exogenous characteristics xi, i.e.
u(1, xi) = β0
1xi and u(−1, xi) = β0
−1xi.
The best response function of individual i given the choices of the other






i = β0xi + si + i
yi = 1 if y∗
i > 0











i denotes the diﬀerence between the utility individual i derives
from choosing yi = 1 and the utility he derives from choosing yi = −1,
conditional on y−i, that is,
y∗
i = V (1,xi,y−i,i(1)) − V (−1,xi,y−i,i(−1)),
with β ≡ β1 − β−1;i ≡ i(1) − i(−1).
Deﬁne x ≡ (x0
1,x0
2,...,x0
N)0 and  ≡ (1,2,...,N)0. A strategy proﬁle
y is a pure Nash equilibrium proﬁle if and only if it is consistent with (4)
for all i, i.e. if after substitution of these values of yi in si we have y∗
i > 0
for all i with yi = 1, and y∗
i ≤ 0 for all i with yi = −1.
2When γ = 0, the model reduces to the standard binary choice formulation without
externalities.
3Milgrom and Roberts (1990, p. 1255). See also Vives (1990) and the textbook treat-
ments of Topkis (1998) and Vives (1999).
6Let Q(β,γ,x,,N) denote the number of pure Nash equilibria given






































with I(·) an indicator function.4 In the model without social interactions
(i.e. γ = 0) each combination of {β,γ = 0,x,} obviously deﬁnes a unique
equilibrium, and thus Q(β,0,x,,N) = 1.
An important feature of the model with social interactions is that, for
a given combination of {β,γ 6= 0,x,}, several strategy proﬁles may be
consistent with (4). For example, if N = 2,γ = 1, and β0x1+1 = β0x2+2 =
−1
2, proﬁles y = (1,1)0 and y = (−1,−1)0 are both consistent with (4). In
the left panel of ﬁgure 1, equilibrium proﬁles for this two-person game are
drawn in -space. The shaded area is the area with multiple equilibria.
2.2 Equilibrium properties
This section provides three propositions on the equilibrium properties of
model (4). Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in pure
strategies. It turns out that the situation with strategic complements (γ >
0) is characterized by fundamentally diﬀerent equilibrium behavior than
the one with strategic substitutes (γ < 0). Moreover, in the latter case it
makes a diﬀerence whether the population has an even or an odd number of
4We follow the convention 0
0 = 1. Note that the expression between brackets checks
for each entry yit of a given strategy proﬁle yt whether the choice is consistent with the
value of the latent variable. If yit = 1, the ﬁrst indicator function contains the relevant
comparison, and for yit = −1 the second. If consistency holds for all entries of a given
proﬁle yt, the expression between brackets has a value of 1 (and zero otherwise). By
aggregating over all 2
N possible strategy proﬁles, one obtains the number of equilibria.
If the disturbances are i.i.d. with cumulative distribution function F(·), the expected































See Soetevent (2004) for some properties of ∂E[Q(β,γ,x,N)]/∂γ.
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Figure 1: Multiple equilibria in -space (N = 2,γ > 0,β0x1 = β0x2 = 0).
members. Propositions 2 and 3 provide strict upper bounds on the number
of equilibria, for the case with strategic complements and for the case with
strategic substitutes, respectively.
Deﬁne zi ≡ β0xi + i and k ≡
PN
i=1 yi, that is, k is the net number
of agents choosing y = 1.5 Rank observations on basis of the values of
zi. Denote the ordered values as z[1] ≥ z[2] ≥ ... ≥ z[N]. Denote the
corresponding values of y for the agent with z[j] as y[j]. Note that the latter
are not ordered, such that it is not precluded that e.g. y[j] < y[j+1].
Proposition 1 Existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies
For every combination {β,γ,x,} there exists at least one vector y ≡ (y1,y2,
...,yN)0 for which (4) holds.
Proof: See the Appendix.
5Note that given N, only those values of k for which N + k is an even number are
possible. This follows from the observation that k = a · 1 − (N − a),a ∈ {0,1,...,N} can
be rewritten as N + k = 2a.
8Proposition 2 Maximum number of equilibria (strategic comple-
ments)
For every combination {β,γ > 0,x,}, the discrete interaction model (4)
with N agents can have at most d(N) distinct equilibria, with




Moreover, for every number N, there exists a combination of {β,γ > 0,x,}
for which Q(β,γ,x,,N) = d(N).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The ﬁrst part of proposition 2 states that in case of strategic comple-
ments the maximal number of equilibria grows linearly in N. The second
part ensures that the upper bound on the number of equilibria is strict.
Proposition 3 Maximum number of equilibria (strategic substi-
tutes)
For every combination {β,γ < 0,x,}, the discrete interaction model (4)
with N agents can have at most d(N) distinct equilibria, with
d(N) = de(N) =
N!
(N/2)!(N/2)!
if N is even,and
d(N) = do(N) =
N!
{(N + 1)/2}!{(N − 1)/2}!
if N is odd.
Moreover, for every even (odd) number N, there exists a combination of
{β,γ < 0,x,} for which Q(β,γ,x,,N) = de(N) (Q(β,γ,x,,N) = do(N)).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that for the situation with strategic substitutes, the
maximal number of equilibria grows exponentially in N. As in the case
with strategic complements, the upper bound on the number of equilibria is
strict. Note that
de(N)
do(N−1) = 2 for all even N and limN→∞
do(N)
de(N−1) ↑ 2 for N
9odd. That is, in the limit adding one agent to the population doubles the
upper bound on the number of equilibria.
It is also worth mentioning that with strategic substitutes |k| = |
PN
i=1 yi|
decreases monotonically to 0 (1) as γ → −∞ for N even (N odd). In fact,
this result holds more generally: in equilibrium, the diﬀerence between the
number of agents choosing y = 1 and the number of agents choosing y = −1,
is smaller when γ is more negative, other things equal.
2.3 Extension to more general interactions
The model considered so far only allows for identical interactions between
all individuals in the group. One can think more general interactions, where
the degree of interaction between two given individuals depends on e.g.
their socio-economic characteristics. In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the
consequences of one particular extension of the model given by (4) in which
the degree of interaction is made gender-dependent. This leads to four
diﬀerent interaction parameters: γGB measures the eﬀect of boys on girls;
γBG from girls on boys, and γGG and γBB the intra-gender eﬀects between






i = β0xi + Si + i
yi = 1 if y∗
i > 0,


















j )/(N − 1) if i is a boy,
with yG
j ≡ yj · I(j is a girl) and yB
j ≡ yj · I(j is a boy), ∀j.
Corollary 1 For every combination {β,γBB ≥ 0,γGG ≥ 0,γGB,γBG,x,}
there exists at least one vector y ≡ (y1,y2,...,yN)0 for which (7) holds.
Proof: See the Appendix.
10The equivalent of proposition 2 for the extended model follows automat-
ically:
Corollary 2 For every combination {β,γBB > 0,γGG > 0,γGB,γBG,x,},
the discrete interaction model given by (7) with NG girls and NB boys can








Moreover, for all NG and NB, there exists a combination of {β,γBB ≥
0,γGG ≥ 0,γGB,γBG,x,} for which the maximum number of equilibria is
obtained.
It is noteworthy that the values of the cross-gender interaction parame-
ters γGB and γBG do not play a role in the derivation of the upper bounds
for the number of equilibria.
3 Estimation by simulation
To estimate the model by maximum likelihood we require the probability
P(y) that we observe y, for any given set of parameter values.
A choice pattern y observed for a particular group is either a single




i > −β0xi − s(y−i) if yi = 1









for all i,i = 1,...,N. Denote the region in -space deﬁned in (8) by W(y,θ),
with θ being the parameters to be estimated. Since W(y,θ) may also sup-
port equilibria other than y, we have P( ∈ W(y,θ)) ≥ P(y).
11Following Bjorn and Vuong (1983) and Kooreman (1994) we make a
randomization assumption in case of multiple equilibria: whenever the model
generates multiple equilibria we assume that one of them will occur with
probability equal to one over the number of equilibria. To determine the
number of equilibria in the various subregions of W(y,θ) we use a simulation
based method. Consider R random draws (indexed by r, r = 1,...,R) from
the joint distribution of (1,...,N) on W(y,θ). For each draw, we calculate
the number of equilibria. Recall that by construction of W(y,θ), y is either
the single equilibrium or one of the multiple equilibria. Let Ωr be the set of
equilibria corresponding to draw r and let Er denote the number of elements
in Ωr (i.e. Er is the number of equilibria at draw r). Then the probability
P(y) that choice pattern y will be observed is consistently estimated by the
frequency simulator







This procedure guarantees the statistical coherency of the model, i.e.
P2N
t=1 P1(y =
yt) = 1, where yt,t = 1,...,N is the enumeration of all elements in Y . Note














with R2 the number of draws from the joint distribution of (1,...,N) on
<N. However, this would require the number of draws to be of a much larger
magnitude to achieve the same precision as achieved when using (9).6
We assume that (1,...,N) is independently normally distributed (the
independence assumption will be relaxed in section 4.4). We have used
values for R1 of 100 and 1000. These values may induce some simulation
6The reason is that in (9), (exact) analytical information on the probability of W(y,θ)
is used. In (10), this probability is estimated together with the probability of actually
observing y conditional on a draw of  being in W(y,θ).
12variance in both the estimated parameters and the estimated standard er-
rors. However, the estimated probabilities are suﬃciently precise as inputs
in a likelihood maximization algorithm, and experiments in which we in-
creased the value of R1, other things equal, suggest that using larger values
for R1 would not substantially change our empirical results. The likelihood
functions were maximized using a Newton-Raphson type of algorithm with
numerically evaluated derivatives.7 The standard errors were obtained by
inverting the approximate Hessian based on the outer products of class spe-
ciﬁc score vectors.
The characterization of the equilibria in propositions 1, 2, and 3 and
their proofs turns out to be extremely helpful in developing an algorithm
for estimation. Let M =
PN
i=1 I(yi = 1), i.e. M denotes the number of
individuals choosing y = 1. Then
PN
i=1 yi = k implies M = 1
2(N +k). From
the proof of proposition 2 it follows that, with γ > 0, the M agents with yi =
1 are those with the M largest values of zi. To determine whether there exists
an equilibrium with
PN
i=1 yi = k, we therefore ﬁrst rank observations on the
basis of the values of zi, for a given draw of (1,...,N). An equilibrium
with
PN
i=1 yi = k exists if and only if the inequalities
(11)
z[N] + k+1
N−1γ ≤ ... ≤ z[M+1] + k+1
N−1γ ≤ 0 <
z[M] + k−1
N−1γ ≤ ... ≤ z[1] + k−1
N−1γ,
with 1 ≤ M = 1
2(N +k) ≤ N −1, are satisﬁed. An equilibrium with M = 0
occurs if and only if zi −γ ≤ 0 for all i; an equilibrium with M = N occurs
if and only if zi + γ > 0 for all i. The proof of proposition 2 also shows
that two vectors y and ˜ y that diﬀer in only one element cannot both be
equilibria. As a result, we only have to check d(N) = bN
2 +1c out of the 2N
choice patterns as possible equilibria.




k logrk(θ), where pk(θ)
and rk(θ) are the ﬁrst and second right hand side term in (9), respectively, for class k.
To increase computational speed, we set ∂rk(θ)/∂θ = 0 in the initial phase of likelihood






Er in (9) only once for a given iteration-
class combination, and keep it constant when evaluating the numerical derivatives.
13Suppose that model (7), with all γ’s positive, has an equilibrium with
MG smoking girls and MB smoking boys. It is straightforward to show that
the smoking girls are those with the largest values of zi in the subset of girls,
and that the smoking boys are those with the largest values of zi in the subset
of boys. As a result, we only have to check d∗(NB,NG) = bNB
2 +1c·bNG
2 +1c
out of the 2N choice patterns as potential equilibria.
Proposition 3 implies that with one or more negative γ’s estimation
is computationally more demanding. In an analysis of a large number of
teenage behaviors - based on the same data and using a continuous version
of the model in the present paper - Kooreman (forthcoming) did not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant negative γ’s. In this paper we impose nonnegativity of γ’s in
the estimation procedure.
From an empirical perspective it is important to note that in the esti-
mated models the probability of a single equilibrium usually turns out to





Er > 0.8. The
estimation results in this paper’s application also appear to be only moder-
ately sensitive with respect to the assumptions regarding the treatment of
multiple equilibria. For example, maximizing a quasi-loglikelihood based on
P( ∈ W(y,θ)) yields estimates similar to those based on P1(y).
4 Empirical application
4.1 The data: the Dutch National School Youth Survey
We will estimate the model outlined in the previous sections using data from
the Dutch National School Youth Survey (NSYS) from the year 2000.8
The data set contains information on the teenagers’ individual character-
8Previous surveys were conducted in 1984, 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996. The NSYS is
a joint eﬀort of the Social and Cultural Planning Oﬃce of The Netherlands (SCP) and
the Netherlands Institute for Family Finance Information (NIBUD). In each survey year
a random sample of high schools in The Netherlands is drawn. A participating school is
compensated by means of a report summarizing the survey results for that school. The
series of surveys is not a panel, although some schools have participated more than once.
14istics, time use, income and expenditures, subjective information on norms
and values, and information on various behaviors and durable goods owner-
ship. There is only limited information on the parents (including education
and working hours) and no information on siblings.
Although in principle all pupils in a sampled class participate in the
survey, some pupils are excluded from the data. In some cases this is because
a pupil was absent when the questionnaires were ﬁlled out, in other cases
because information on some of the variables is missing. We exclude classes
with more than 24 students. The resulting data contains information on
7534 students in 485 classes in 70 schools.
All information is self-reported. Thus, strictly speaking, our analysis
measures social interactions in how teenagers report on their behavior. The
results for “asking parents’ permission for purchases” may provide some
insight in potential diﬀerences between social interactions in reported be-
havior and in actual behavior. Asking parents for permission before making
a purchase is an aspect of out-of-class behavior. Since this primarily con-
cerns the relationship between a pupil and his or her parents, we expect
very weak or no endogenous social interaction eﬀects in this type of actual
behavior. However, if pupils copy each others’ responses to the survey ques-
tions when ﬁlling out the questionnaire, spurious social interaction eﬀects
might be found.9
9A US data set which is comparable to the present one is the National Education and
Longitudinal Study (NELS), see e.g. Gaviria and Raphael (2001). Both the Dutch NSYS
and the NELS focus on non-cognitive outcomes within schools. The NELS is a biannual
survey, ﬁrst held in 1988, and samples students within roughly 1000 schools. An important
diﬀerence with the Dutch NSYS is that the NELS surveys only a relatively small group of
students within each school. For example, in the 1990 sample used by Gaviria and Raphael,
the mean sample size per school was 13.3 students. While the NELS contains information
on school averages, these are not available per class, grade, or gender. This limits the
possibilities for an analysis of interactions within schools (for example, it is impossible to
allow for a school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect) and it precludes any analysis of social interactions
within classes. Two other US data sets on teenagers with peer group information are the
Teenage Attitudes and Practices (TAPS) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths
(NLSY). However, the TAPS only contains subjective information on a respondent’s four
best same-sex friends, whereas the NLSY only has subjective peer information based on
questions of the type “What percentage of kids in your grade...?”.
154.2 Speciﬁcation of the empirical model
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data we will not be able to fully
account for the identiﬁcation problems that characterize the empirical anal-
ysis of social interactions. In order to provide a proper perspective for the
interpretation of the empirical results to be presented, we brieﬂy discuss
the identiﬁcation issues in relation to the present data set: i) the deﬁni-
tion of the reference group, ii) endogenous versus contextual eﬀects, and iii)
non-random selection into reference groups.
The deﬁnition of the reference group
As in any empirical analysis on social interaction we require an assump-
tion regarding the deﬁnition of the reference group – Who interacts with
whom? A number of empirical papers have deﬁned the reference group of
an individual as the group of all persons in the population within the same
age group and with the same education level, using the sample analogues
as an approximation; see e.g. Kapteyn et al. (1997) and Aronsson et al.
(1999). This is a crude deﬁnition, largely motivated by data limitations.
A more attractive alternative is to use subjective information on an indi-
vidual’s reference group, as in Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998). However, the
information on the reference group of a sampled individual is often limited
as these reference group members are not themselves included in the sample.
The data in the current analysis can be viewed as a reference group based
sample as all students within a sampled class are interviewed in principle.
While teenage behavior is obviously also inﬂuenced by persons outside the
class, classmates are likely to play a dominant role in shaping teenagers’
preferences and behavior. On a weekday, the average student in the sam-
ple spends about six hours in his or her school class. The total time spent
on school related activities (including homework and commuting) is about
eight hours per weekday, more than ﬁfty percent of the daily waking time.
16Teenagers within the same school or class therefore form social groups that
are more clearly deﬁned and delineated than in many other situations in
which social interactions are likely to play a role. Obviously, the deﬁnition
of the reference group could be extended to allow for interactions with stu-
dents outside the class. Also, one could in principle reﬁne the speciﬁcation
of social groups within the class beyond the boy-girl distinction, for example
on the basis of ethnicity, or by allowing the eﬀect of younger and of older
classmates to be diﬀerent. These extensions are left for future research.
Endogenous versus contextual eﬀects
Gaviria and Raphael (2001) argue that students are less exposed to the
family background of their school peers than they are exposed to the family
background of peers residing in the same neighborhood. They conjecture
that in an analysis of interactions through schools contextual eﬀects are
less important than in an analysis of interactions through neighborhoods.
In their empirical analysis they assume that contextual eﬀects are absent.
Kawaguchi (2004) invokes subjective information about the perception of
peer behaviors to achieve full identiﬁcation.10 He ﬁnds that the absence
of contextual eﬀects cannot be rejected. The empirical results presented
below are based on the assumption that there are no contextual eﬀects. The
estimates on the endogenous social interaction eﬀects should therefore be
interpreted as upper bounds on the true eﬀects.
Non-random selection into reference groups
To control for non-random selection into schools to some extent we will
also estimate a version of the model including school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. To
control for selection into classes conditional on selection into schools we also
allow for within-class correlation of error terms. This correlation coeﬀcient
10Identiﬁcation is based on the problematic assumption that perceived behavior is not
determined by actual behavior.
17is identiﬁed by the nonlinearity of the model and the implicit imposition of
equal within-class correlation coeﬃcients across classes.
The vector x includes age, and dummy variables for gender, for be-
ing non-Dutch (based on the question “Do you consider yourself to be
Dutch?”), for the type of education (MAVO (lower level), HAVO (inter-
mediate level), and VWO (higher level), with ‘vocational’ as reference cate-
gory), for Catholic, for Protestant, and for living in a ‘single parent family’
(based on the question “Do you live in a family with father and mother?”).
Unfortunately, a large proportion of teenagers do not know their parents’
education level (41 and 36 percent for father’s and mother’s education level,
respectively). We therefore choose not to include parents’ eduation levels
as explanatory variables. However, we do include the father’s working time
and the mother’s working time (for a pupil with a single parent the working
time of the missing parent is set equal to the sample average).11 Table 1
provides sample statistics for both the endogenous and exogenous variables
in the model.
4.3 Estimation results
Table 2 presents four versions of the estimated model for smoking. The ﬁrst
column contains estimation results for the model without social interactions
(i.e. with γGG = γGB = γBB = γBG = 0). The probability of smoking
strongly increases in age. The eﬀect of gender is insigniﬁcant. The higher
the level of the type of education, the smaller the probability that a pupil
smokes. We also ﬁnd that pupils from single parent households and pupils
whose mother has a paid job have a signiﬁcantly larger probability to smoke.
The variables non-Dutch, Catholic, and Protestant negatively aﬀect pupils’
smoking behavior. The eﬀects are largely consonant with earlier empirical
11A number of studies have reported indicators for self-esteem to be important explana-
tory variables in the analysis of teenage behavior; see e.g. Smetters and Gravelle (2001).
We choose not to include such a variable because of its potential endogeneity.
18studies on smoking behavior; see for example, Gruber and Zinman (2001)
and Gruber (2001).
Column two presents results for the model with social interactions. All
social interaction coeﬃcients are positive and highly signiﬁcant. The largest
one is γBB, measuring the boy-boy interaction, followed in size by γGG,
measuring the interaction between girls. The coeﬃcients γGB and γBG,
measuring the cross-gender interactions are smaller in size and not signif-
icant. Note that the inclusion of the social interaction coeﬃcients hardly
aﬀects the other parameters.
We have also estimated the model for truancy, moped ownership, cell
phone ownership, and asking parents’ permission for purchases.12 Table
3 reports the results. (For ease of comparison the ﬁrst column in table 3
repeats the second column from table 2).
For truancy, the intra-gender eﬀects are stronger than for smoking.
Moreover, we now also have signiﬁcant cross-gender interactions. The prob-
ability of truancy sharply increases in age, is larger for non-Dutch pupils,
and is lower for students in VWO, the highest education level in high school.
Moped ownership is the only type of behavior where we ﬁnd a large
gender eﬀect: The probability of moped ownership is much larger for boys
than for girls. It strongly increases in age (the legal minimum age for riding
a moped in The Netherlands is 16) and decreases in the level of education.
It is also the only type of behavior where we have a clear asymmetry in
social interactions between genders. For a boy, the probability of moped
12The variable ‘truancy’ in the empirical analysis is based on the question “How often
have you been playing truant during the last (school)month?”. As truanters have a larger
probability of being absent when the questionnaire is being ﬁlled out, there is a potential
selection bias. The eﬀect on the estimated social interaction coeﬃcients, however, is likely
to be small. The absence of a group of truanters with strong mutual interactions might
bias the estimated γ’s towards zero, but the presence of a group on non-truanters with
strong mutual interactions will have the opposite eﬀect. Moreover, tentative calculations
indicate that the probability of a student truanting on a random schoolday is in the order
of one percent.
19ownership is strongly aﬀected by moped ownership of other boys and, to a
somewhat lesser extent, of girls. Moped ownership for girls, on the other
hand, is not aﬀected by social interactions.
For cell phone ownership we again ﬁnd an increasing eﬀect of age and
a decreasing eﬀect of education. Teenagers from a single parent family
have a much larger probability of owning a cell phone. All social interaction
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, with the girl-girl eﬀect being largest in magnitude.
The probability of asking parents’ permission before purchasing some-
thing strongly decreases in age, and is smaller for non-Dutch pupils and
for pupils in a single parent household. It also signiﬁcantly decreases in fa-
ther’s and mother’s working time. The four social interaction coeﬃcients are
(jointly) insigniﬁcant. This suggests that students do not copy each other’s
responses when ﬁlling out the questionnaire.
4.4 Correlated within-class error terms
Clearly, a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation would be obtained by allowing for class
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. With the current data, the estimation of class spe-
ciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects is infeasible. Apart from the dependence of identiﬁcation
on functional form assumptions, estimation would have to be based on a
much smaller number of observations since classes with non-smokers only
(or with smokers only) cannot be used. However, we can estimate the model
with class speciﬁc random eﬀects.13 We assume the covariance matrix Σ of
(1,...,N) to be a ‘one-factor’ matrix such that Σ = {ρij} with ρij = ρ if
i 6= j and ρij = 1 if i = j. To calculate the probabilities P( ∈ W(y,θ))
we use a decomposition simulator which eﬀectively depends on only a one-
dimensional random variable; cf. Stern (1992).14
13As we assume that the within class correlation coeﬃcient between error terms does
not vary across classes, this random eﬀects model calls for the estimation of only one
additional parameter.
14Let the random variables u1,...,uN, and v be independently normally distributed
with zero means; var(ui) = 1 − ρ, i = 1,...,N and var(v) = ρ. (We require ρ > 0; the
procedure for ρ < 0 is slightly diﬀerent. Note, however, that the positive deﬁniteness of Σ
20We ﬁrst estimated this version of the model for smoking without social
interaction eﬀects. We found the estimated ρ to be small but signiﬁcant
(ˆ ρ=0.098, t-value 4.5), with the other parameters largely unaﬀected. When
estimating the model with social interaction eﬀects, the estimated ρ is virtu-
ally equal to zero and insigniﬁcant, with the other parameters being identical
to those in the second column of table 2. This seems to indicate that the
results in table 2 are not driven by unobserved variables at the class level.
4.5 The magnitude of the social interaction eﬀects
In order to gain some insight in the magnitude of the social interaction
eﬀects implied by the estimated γ’s consider a reference class (largely based
on median values of exogenous variables). This is a hypothetical MAVO
class composed of 8 girls and 8 boys; all of them are aged 14, Dutch, non-
Protestant, non-Catholic, and come from a two-parent household with a
father working 36 hours per week and a mother working 16 hours per week.
Using the estimated parameters from table 3, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium
the expected number of truanters is 3.14 (the probability of truancy is 0.191
for girls and 0.201 for boys).15
Now suppose that a surely truanting girl is added to this class (i.e. we
add a girl with characteristics such that her probability of truancy is virtually
equal to 1, irrespective of the behavior of others). Without social interaction
eﬀects, the expected fraction of truanters would rise from 0.196 (3.14/16) to
0.244 (4.14/17), a 24 percent increase. Taking social interaction eﬀects into
account, the new equilibrium fraction of truanters rises to 0.278 (4.73/17),
an increase of 41 percent compared to the original level. If a surely non-
implies −
1
N−1 < ρ < 1.) Let i = ui + v, i = 1,...,N. Then Cov() = Σ, with Σ deﬁned
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15All numbers are based on simulations with R=100000.
21truanting girl is added to this class, the expected fraction decreases from
0.196 (3.14/16) to 0.185 (3.14/17) without social interaction eﬀects (a 6
percent decrease), and to 0.169 (2.88/17) with social interaction eﬀects (a
16 percent decrease).
The model also implies that a change in the value of an exogenous vari-
able of only one of the pupils in principle aﬀects the behavior of all pupils
in class. Suppose, for example, that the mother of one of the girls in the
reference class increases her working hours to 46 per week. Then the equi-
librium truancy probability of her daughter increases from 0.191 to 0.210.
However, it also changes the equilibrium truancy probabilities of the other
girls (from 0.1909 to 0.1915) and boys (from 0.2002 to 0.2012). As a re-
sult, the expected number of truanters in class increases not by only 0.019
(0.210-0.191), but by 0.031.
4.6 School speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
Smoking behavior in all classes of a given school is likely to be aﬀected by a
number of unobserved school speciﬁc factors, like smoking behavior of teach-
ers, the school’s policy regarding smoking, and proximity of tobacco outlets.
Similar eﬀects are likely to be present for the other behaviors. Unobserved
school speciﬁc factors may also be related to a non-random assignment of
pupils to schools. For example, parents who smoke themselves may be less
likely to send their children to a school in which smoking is strictly prohib-
ited. Signiﬁcant social interaction coeﬃcients may then merely reﬂect the
failure to control for these unobserved eﬀects. While the estimation of class
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects is infeasible with the current data, we estimate in this
section a version with school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
The inclusion of school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects amounts to estimating 69
additional parameters (one school is reference category) for truancy, cell
phone ownership, and asking permission. For smoking two other schools
22are omitted because they have non-smokers only; for a similar reason ﬁve
schools are omitted in the moped ownership model. For smoking the results
are reported in the fourth column of table 2 (the third column reports the
results for the model without social interaction but with ﬁxed eﬀects). All
social interaction coeﬃcients are now smaller in magnitude, and none of
them is signiﬁcant; a χ2-test shows that the γ’s are also jointly insigniﬁcant
(p = 0.216).
Table 4 reports the results for all discrete choice behaviors. (For ease
of comparison the ﬁrst column in table 4 repeats the fourth column from
table 2). In addition to smoking, the social interaction coeﬃcients are also
jointly insigniﬁcant for moped ownership, cell phone ownership, and asking
permission, and several γ’s – in particular those related to cross-gender
interactions – reached their lower bound.
Truancy is the exception. Both intra-gender interaction coeﬃcients are
still highly signiﬁcant. Although smaller than in Table 3, the eﬀects are still
substantial in magnitude, in particular the girl-girl interaction.
In all cases, the ﬁxed eﬀects are jointly signiﬁcant at the 5 percent sig-
niﬁcance level.
5 Conclusion
We derived a number of equilibrium properties for the binary choice interac-
tion model with a ﬁnite number of agents. Both for the case with strategic
complements and strategic substitutes, equilibrium existence was proved and
tight upper bounds were derived for the size of the set of equilibria, given
the number of agents and the degree of interaction between them. We also
brieﬂy discussed the consequences for the set of equilibria when the model
is extended to allow for gender-dependent interactions. The main ﬁnding
here is that the cross-gender parameters are irrelevant in the derivation of
the upper bounds.
23In our application to teenagers’ discrete choices, we found that most of
the social interaction coeﬃcients become insigniﬁcant once the model allows
for school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. An exception is truancy, for which both intra-
gender social interaction coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant. The fact that we do
ﬁnd signiﬁcant social interaction eﬀects for a type of behavior closely related
to school (truancy) and do not ﬁnd such eﬀects for behaviors farther away
from school strongly suggests that our model measures genuine endogenous
social interaction eﬀects rather than unobserved social group eﬀects.
The work presented in this paper indicates various possible extensions for
future research. An example is to allow for more general interaction struc-
tures, for example by making interaction parameters dependent on socio-
economic characteristics. Another, more general issue – typically neglected
in the empirical social interactions literature to date – is the question which
type of equilibrium concept is appropriate. The fact that classmates inter-
act daily, usually for many years, and often become friends suggests that
non-cooperative Nash equilibria may not always be plausible.
While the present data set has a number of important advantages in
terms of information on reference group members, the empirical results are
subject to the usual qualiﬁcations regarding inferences about social inter-
actions based on cross-section data. Future steps toward increasing our
understanding of social interactions will require more informative data and
models characterized by a tight link between game theory and econometrics.
24Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Equilibrium existence
The case for γ = 0 is obvious. We prove proposition 1 for the game with
strategic complements (γ > 0) and the game with strategic substitutes
(γ < 0) separately. For the ﬁrst case, existence can be readily proved by
showing that the game belongs to the class of supermodular games. Ex-
istence then immediately follows from using Theorem 5 in Milgrom and
Roberts (1990, p. 1265). In this appendix however, we will follow for both
cases the alternative route of proving equilibrium existence through ﬁnding
an explicit equilibrium for all combinations of {β,γ,x,}. This procedure
may give more insight into some of the peculiarities of the model.
Every possible combination of {β,γ > 0,x,} clearly falls into one of the
three following categories
(i) z[1] ≤ 0;
(ii) z[N] > 0;
(iii) z[1] > 0,z[N] ≤ 0;
We show that for each z in every category there is an associated y for which
(4) holds, for all values γ > 0.
(i) z[1] ≤ 0:
yi = −1,i = 1,2,...,N (k = −N) is an equilibrium solution, since
y∗
[1] = z[1] − γ N−1
N−1 ≤ 0. This implies that y∗
[i] ≤ 0 ∀i since γ N−1
N−1 is a
constant and z[i] weakly decreases with i.
(ii) z[N] > 0:
yi = 1,i = 1,2,...,N (k = N) is an equilibrium solution, since y∗
[i] =
z[i] + γ N−1
N−1 > 0,∀i.
25(iii) z[1] > 0,z[N] ≤ 0:
Deﬁne M ≡ 0 if z[j] ≤ −γ
(2j−N−1)





N−1 ;∀j ≤ i

otherwise. Five examples of se-
quences of z[i] with N = 6 and γ = 1 are plotted in ﬁgure 2 together
with the corresponding values of M. The solid line represents the
equation z[i] = −γ
(2i−N−1)
N−1 .
If M = 0, y[i] = −1, i = 1,2,...,N is an equilibrium solution, since
y∗
[i] = z[i] − γ ≤ z[1] − γ ≤ 0, ∀i. (See the +-sequence in ﬁgure 2.)
If M > 0, y[i] = 1 for i = 1,2...,M and y[i] = −1 for i = M +
1,M + 2,...,N (k = M − [N − M] = 2M − N) is an equilibrium
solution, since y∗
[i] = z[i] + γ 2M−N−1
N−1 > 0 for i = 1,2,...,M and
y∗
[j] ≤ y∗
[M+1] = z[M+1] + γ 2M−N+1
N−1 = z[M+1] + γ
2(M+1)−N−1
N−1 ≤ 0 for
all j = M + 1,M + 2,...,N.
Note that for sequences of z[i]’s for which M = N (like the sequence
of circles and x-es in ﬁgure 2), y[i] = −1, i = 1,2,...,N is another
equilibrium solution iﬀ. z[1] ≤ γ. In ﬁgure 2, this condition holds for
the sequence of x-es but not for the sequence of circles. 
Strategic substitutes (γ < 0)
In this case, we distinguish between the case where the number of subjects
N is even and the case where this number is odd.




. Suppose that m >
N/2, that is, the majority of the subjects have a value of z greater than




















, for r = 1,2,...,m − N/2 − 1.
First consider the case m > N/2 + 1. Since the intervals are non-






















Figure 2: Five examples of z[i]-sequences and the corresponding solutions




N−1 ;∀j ≤ i

for the case with N = 6 and
γ = 1.
overlapping and since I0∪I1∪...∪Im−N/2 = [0,∞), −γ is in one and only one
of these intervals. If −γ ∈ I0, y = (1,1,...,1m,−1,...,−1)0, (k = 2m−N)
is an equilibrium, since for this solution y∗
[1] ≥ ... ≥ y∗
[m] = z[m]+γ 2m−N−1
N−1 >
0 and y∗
[N] ≤ ... ≤ y∗
[m+1] = z[m+1] + γ 2m−N+1
N−1 ≤ 0. If −γ ∈ Ir, for
r = 1,2,...,m−N/2−1, y = (1,1,...,1m−r,−1,...,−1)0 (k = 2(m−r)−N)
is an equilibrium, since for this solution y∗
[1] ≥ ... ≥ y∗
m−r = z[m−r] +
γ
2(m−r)−N−1
N−1 > 0 and y∗
[N] ≤ ... ≤ y∗
[m−r+1] = z[m−r+1] +γ
2(m−r)−N+1
N−1 ≤ 0.
If −γ ∈ Im−N/2, y = (1,1,...,1N/2,−1,...,−1)0 (k = 0) is an equilib-
rium, since for this solution y∗
[1] ≥ ... ≥ y∗
[N/2] = z[N/2] + γ −1
N−1 > 0 and
y∗
[N] ≤ ... ≤ y∗
[N/2+1] = z[N/2+1] + γ 1
N−1 ≤ 0.
If m = N/2 + 1, then I0 ∪ Im−N/2 = I0 ∪ I1 = [0,∞). Applying similar
reasoning, one can verify that y = (1,1,...,1N/2+1,−1,...,−1)0, (k = 2)
is an equilibrium when −γ ∈ I0 and that y = (1,1,...,1N/2,−1,...,−1)0
(k = 0) is an equilibrium when −γ ∈ I1.
27If m = N/2, then y = (1,1,...,1N/2,−1,...,−1)0 is an equilibrium for
all −γ ∈ (0,∞), since y∗
[1] ≥ ... ≥ y∗
[N/2] = z[N/2] + γ −1
N−1 > z[N/2] > 0 and
y∗
[N] ≤ ... ≤ y∗
[N/2+1] = z[N/2+1] + γ 1
N−1 < z[N/2+1] ≤ 0.
Due to symmetry, the above argument can be applied for m < N/2 with
m replaced by ˜ m ≡ N − m ≥ N/2 and the roles of the outcomes +1 and -1
interchanged.
N odd The above argument can also be applied for odd N. Suppose that


























for r = 1,2,...,m − (N + 1)/2 − 1.
Taking the case that m > (N + 1)/2 + 1, it follows that for −γ ∈
I0, y = (1,1,...,1m,−1,...,−1)0 (k = 2m − N) is an equilibrium; for
−γ ∈ Ir, r = 1,2,...,m − (N + 1)/2 − 1, y = (1,1,...,1m−r,−1,...,−1)0
(k = 2(m − r) − N) is an equilibrium; and for −γ ∈ Im−(N+1)/2, y =
(1,1,...,1(N+1)/2,−1,...,−1)0 (k = 1) is an equilibrium.
If m = (N +1)/2+1, then I0 ∪Im−(N+1)/2 = I0 ∪I1 = [0,∞). Applying
similar reasoning, one can verify that y = (1,1,...,1(N+1)/2+1,−1,...,−1)0
(k = 3) is an equilibrium when −γ ∈ I0 and that y = (1,1,...,1(N+1)/2,−1,...,−1)0
(k = 1) is an equilibrium when −γ ∈ I1.
If m = (N+1)/2, then y = (1,1,...,1(N+1)/2,−1,...,−1)0 is an equilib-
rium for all −γ ∈ (0,∞), since y∗
[1] ≥ ... ≥ y∗
[(N+1)/2] = z[(N+1)/2] +γ ·0 > 0
and y∗
[N] ≤ ... ≤ y∗
[(N+1)/2+1] = z[(N+1)/2+1] + γ 2
N−1 < z[N/2+1] ≤ 0. Again,
the case with m < (N + 1)/2 follows from symmetry. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Maximum number of equilibria (strate-
gic complements)
The proof for strategic complements uses the following lemma:









where zi ≡ β0xi + i.
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider an agent i with yi = 1 and an agent j with yj = −1. Suppose
zj ≥ zi −
2γ
N−1. Then y∗











i . But since
yi = 1 and yj = −1 implies y∗
i > 0 ≥ y∗
j, we have a contradiction. 
The lemma’s eﬀect is that it restricts the maximum number of potential
equilibria to N +1. The following observation is an immediate consequence
of lemma 1:
1 In any equilibrium the agents with yi = 1 are those with the largest
values for zi.
Now consider two vectors y and ˜ y that diﬀer in one element only. With-
out loss of generality, assume that yi = 1 and ˜ yi = −1 for some i. Deﬁne
y−i ≡ (y1,y2,...,yi−1,yi+1,...,yN)0 and ˜ y−i ≡ (˜ y1, ˜ y2,..., ˜ yi−1, ˜ yi+1,..., ˜ yN)0.









j6=i ˜ yj =
˜ y∗
i given a combination of {β,γ,x,}. This implies that yi = ˜ yi and we ar-
rive at a contradiction. Note that this result holds irrespective of γ being
positive or negative. The following observation is thus obtained:
2 Two vectors y and ˜ y that diﬀer in only one element cannot both belong
to the set of equilibria.
From the observations 1 and 2 it follows that the number of equilibria for
a given combination of {β,γ > 0,x,} can be at most d = bN
2 + 1c, where
bwc denotes the largest integer not larger than w. To give an example:
When the number of agents N = 8, the maximum number of equilibria can
be at most bN
2 +1c = 5. Due to statements 1 and 2, the strategy proﬁles of
29these equilibria must be strictly ordered and diﬀer in at least two elements.
This leaves the following ﬁve strategy proﬁles as the only candidates:
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1)0; (1,1,1,1,1,1,−1,−1)0; (1,1,1,1,−1,−1,−1,−1)0;
(1,1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1)0; (−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1)0.
This proves the ﬁrst part of proposition 2. The proof of the second part
– the upper bound on the number of equilibria is strict – runs as follows.




(1,...,1,−1,−1)0 if N is even,




(1,...,1N−2(j−1),−1N−2(j−1)+1,...,−1)0 if N is even,
(1,...,1N−2(j−1)−1,−1N−2(j−1),...,−1)0 if N is odd,
with j = 3,...,d − 1.
yd = (−1,−1,...,−1)0.
First note that y1 can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome if and
only if z[N] > −γ and that yd can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome
if and only if z[1] ≤ γ. Further note that yd−i, i = 1,...,d − 2 can be
sustained as equilibria if and only if z[2i] > γ N−4i+1
N−1 and z[2i+1] ≤ γ N−4i−1
N−1 .
The fact that these necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the values of z
can be satisﬁed simultaneously completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3: Maximum number of equilibria (strate-
gic substitutes)
In order to prove proposition 3, we will use:
Lemma 2 For a given combination {β,γ < 0,x,}, y and ˜ y are both equi-





16When N is odd, there has to be one equilibrium that diﬀers in at least three elements
when compared to any of the other equilibria. Without loss of generality we assume the
last three elements of y to be the three elements that move together.
30The proof of lemma 2 uses:
Lemma 3 If for a given combination {β,γ < 0,x,} there exists an equi-
librium y with y[j] = −1 and y[j+1] = 1, then there also exists an equilibrium
˜ y with ˜ y[j] = 1 and ˜ y[j+1] = −1 and ˜ y[i] = y[i] for i 6= j,j + 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
From the fact that y is an equilibrium with y[j] = −1 and y[j+1] = 1, it
follows that
y∗









However, since γ < 0, we have
˜ y∗
[j] = z[j] + γ
k − 1
N − 1





[j+1] = z[j+1] + γ
k + 1
N − 1




It then follows that ˜ y with ˜ y[i] = y[i] for i 6= j,j + 1 and ˜ y[j] = 1 and
˜ y[j+1] = −1 is also an equilibrium. 
Having proved lemma 3 we can now prove lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that y with
PN
i=1 yi = k and ˜ y with
PN
i=1 ˜ yi = ˜ k and ˜ k 6= k are
both equilibria of (4), given a combination {β,γ < 0,x,}. From lemma 3










,...,−1N) are both equilibria given
{β,γ < 0,x,}. Assume without loss of generality that ˜ k > k, that is:
˜ k − k ≥ 2. Let ν be the ﬁrst subject whose choice is −1 in equilibrium yk
and +1 in equilibrium y




≤ 0 and z[ν] + γ





˜ k − 1
N − 1
= z[ν]+γ
˜ k − k + k + 1 − 2
N − 1
= z[ν] + γ
k + 1
N − 1 | {z }
≤0
+γ
(˜ k − k) − 2
N − 1 | {z }
≤0
≤ 0,
and the contradiction follows. 
The message of lemma 2 is that for a given value of γ < 0, two diﬀerent




i=1 ˜ yi. That is, both
equilibria must have the same number of subjects with outcome +1 and
with outcome -1.
Repeated application of lemma 3 shows that a strategy proﬁle y with
PN
i=1 yi = k can only be an equilibrium if the ordered (with respect to the
zi’s) strategy proﬁle y = (11,12,...,1k,−1k+1,...,−1N)0 is an equilibrium.
This result will prove to be useful later on in deriving upper bounds for the
number of equilibria that may be sustained for a given value of γ.
To complete the proof of Proposition 3, note that the ﬁrst part of lemma
2 implies that the maximum number of possible equilibria subject to the
condition
PN
i=1 yi = k is obtained when k is chosen to equal 0 (+1 or -1)
when N is even (odd). In that case, there are N/2 ((N +1)/2 or (N −1)/2)
agents choosing +1 and the others choosing −1, giving the upper bounds
on the number of possible equilibria as given by d(N) in proposition 3.
What is left to show is that there exists a combination of {β,γ < 0,x,}
for which the maximum number of equilibria is obtained. From lemma 2
we know that, given a combination of {β,γ < 0,x,}, every element in the
equilibrium set must have the same number of agents choosing y = 1. For
N is even, the set can thus only have de(N) elements when the set contains
all strategy proﬁles for which the number of agents choosing y = 1 equals
the number of agents choosing y = −1. For each of these proﬁles to be an
equilibrium, it must be optimal for each agent i to choose yi = 1 given that
P
j6=i yj = −1 and to choose yi = −1 given that
P
j6=i yj = 1. In particular,









For γ negative enough, this condition is satisﬁed irrespective of the values
of z[1],...z[N].
For N is odd, the equilibrium set can only contain do(N) elements when
the set contains all strategy proﬁles for which
PN
i=1 yi = 1 or all strategy
proﬁles for which
PN
i=1 yi = −1. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
each of the proﬁles for which
PN
i=1 yi = 1 to be an equilibrium, are
(A.1) z[1] + γ
2
N − 1
≤ 0 and z[N] > 0,
and the corresponding conditions for the strategy proﬁles with
PN
i=1 yi = −1
are




From these conditions it follows that the equilibrium set with do(N) ele-
ments for which
PN
i=1 yi = 1 (
PN
i=1 yi = −1) is only obtainable when all z
values are positive (non-positive). Together this proves proposition 3. 
Lemma 2 and the observation that for the equilibria in the proof of
proposition 1 |k| = |
PN
i=1 yi| monotonically decreases as γ → −∞, together
lead to the following corollary17 that for all equilibria, |k| decreases mono-
tonically to 0 (1) as γ → −∞, given N even (odd). This result is consonant
with intuition: variation in behavior increases when the utility derived from
being diﬀerent increases.
17The corresponding result for positive interactions is that |
PN
i=1 yi| % N as γ → ∞.
That is, in the limit all agents conform to y = 1 or to y = −1 regardless their private
utility such that variation in behavior is minimized.









yi| & 1 as γ → −∞ and N is odd.
Proof of Corollary 1
Deﬁne ∀i, zG





N−1 + i if i is a girl and zB





N−1 + i if i is a boy. Denote the ordered values of zG
i (zB
i ) as zG
[i]
(zB
[i]) such that zG
[1] ≥ zG
[2] ≥ ... ≥ z[NG] (zB
[1] ≥ zB
[2] ≥ ... ≥ z[NB]), with NG
(NB) denoting the total number of girls (boys) in the sample.
The line of reasoning used in the proof of proposition 1 now can be
applied to the subset of girls (boys), with z[i] replaced by zG
[i] (zB
[i]) and γ
replaced by γGG (γBB). 
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37Table 1: Sample statistics at the individual level (7,534 observations)
mean median st. dev. min. max.
girl 0.5157 1.0000 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000
age 14.21 14.0000 1.45 11.0000 21.0000
non-Dutch 0.091 0.0000 0.287 0.0000 1.0000
single parent hh. 0.084 0.0000 0.278 0.0000 1.0000
MAVO 0.336 0.0000 0.473 0.0000 1.0000
HAVO 0.182 0.0000 0.386 0.0000 1.0000
VWO 0.152 0.0000 0.359 0.0000 1.0000
working time father 35.95 36.0000 12.76 0.0000 46.0000
working time mother 15.29 6.0000 15.13 0.0000 46.0000
catholic 0.234 0.0000 0.423 0.0000 1.0000
protestant 0.185 0.0000 0.388 0.0000 1.0000
smoking 0.090 0.0000 0.287 0.000 1.000
truancy 0.184 0.0000 0.387 0.000 1.000
asking for permission 0.863 1.000 0.344 0.000 1.000
moped 0.064 0.0000 0.245 0.000 1.000
cell phone 0.211 0.000 0.408 0.000 1.000
girls (3,885 observations)
smoking 0.093 0.000 0.290 0.000 1.000
truancy 0.174 0.000 0.379 0.000 1.000
asking for permission 0.854 1.000 0.353 0.000 1.000
moped 0.029 0.000 0.167 0.000 1.000
cell phone 0.203 0.000 0.402 0.000 1.000
boys (3,649 observations)
smoking 0.088 0.000 0.283 0.000 1.000
truancy 0.194 0.0000 0.396 0.000 1.000
asking for permission 0.873 1.000 0.333 0.000 1.000
moped 0.102 0.000 0.303 0.000 1.000
cell phone 0.219 0.000 0.414 0.000 1.000
38Table 2: Estimation results; smoking (t-values in parentheses)
with ﬁxed eﬀects
no SI with SI no SI with SI
constant -4.21 -3.46 -4.74 -4.67
(-19.2) (-12.2) (-6.9) (-6.5)
girl 0.044 -0.037 0.025 0.030
(1.0) (-0.2) (0.5) (0.1)
age 0.188 0.167 0.176 0.174
(12.3) (9.7) (7.7) (7.4)
non-Dutch -0.269 -0.264 -0.204 -0.202
(-3.3) (-3.1) (-1.9) (-1.9)
single parent family 0.210 0.194 0.224 0.222
(3.2) (2.9) (3.0) (2.9)
MAVO 0.167 0.182 0.245 0.247
(3.6) (3.4) (2.9) (2.9)
HAVO -0.052 -0.060 -0.102 -0.105
(-0.9) (-1.0) (-1.1) (-1.1)
VWO -0.198 -0.145 -0.266 -0.263
(-3.2) (-2.1) (-2.6) (-2.4)
father’s working time 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.4) (1.3) (1.2) (1.2)
mother’s working time 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(3.5) (3.3) (3.2) (3.1)
catholic -0.211 -0.207 -0.200 -0.197
(-4.3) (-4.1) (-2.8) (-2.7)
protestant -0.122 -0.154 -0.152 -0.148
(-2.2) (-2.6) (-1.7) (-1.6)
γBB — 0.722 — 0.125
(4.4) (0.7)
γBG — 0.389 — 0.015
(1.6) (0.1)
γGB — 0.336 — 0.041
(1.7) (0.2)
γGG — 0.575 — 0.113
(3.6) (0.6)
log-likelihood function -2163.7 -2151.3 -2109.5 -2106.9
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